In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Building Literacy Bridges for Adolescents Using Holocaust Literature and TheatreWayne Brinda (bio)IntroductionDo you have a sibling or best friend whom you dared to do something? Did you ever slip surreptitiously into a place where you should not be? What if your best friend or sibling later became your enemy because of a situation beyond your control? Could that happen? What would you do? Think about those (...) questions as you read this excerpt from In My Brother's Image: Twin Brothers Separated by Faith after the Holocaust and visualize the action:The boys look more alike than brothers. In fact, they are identical twins, indistinguishable in the smooth innocence of their faces, their wide brown eyes, and their hair, nearly shaven to their scalps to thwart the summer heat... At the entrance to the grand church of St. Stephen's Basilica in Budapest, the boys slip surreptitiously through the six-inch-wide opening of the formidable oak middle door, with its inlaid bronze portraits of the Hungarian kings. They giggle gleefully and a bit nervously as they peer into the dimly lit chamber, which feels refreshingly cool in contrast to the scorching afternoon sun they have just escaped. The twins mimic and build on each other's playful daring. Even their spirited laughter is identical, punctuated by squeals of delight... Let's go find his hand. What? St. Stephen's hand. I heard that his hand is kept in a golden box behind the altar somewhere. Let's go find it. No. We're not supposed to be back there. That's the craziest thing I ever heard—a king's hand inside a box in a church. He must have been pretty mad when they cut his hand off.1 [End Page 31]This small theatrical imaginative experience begins the adventure of two twin Hungarian Jewish boys who became caught up in World War II, the Holocaust, communism, and the aftermath.Those two boys became the father and uncle of the author, Eugene Pogany, who wrote In My Brother's Image: Twin Brothers Separated by Faith after the Holocaust. Pogany recalls and tries to reconcile their experiences, differences, and conflicts with each other that lasted a lifetime and beyond. As educators and those who work with adolescents, we seek to reconcile the past experiences and conflicts our students have with reading by finding strategies that bridge adolescents and literature. Two powerful tools for building such bridges are nonfiction literature written about the experiences of young people and adults during and after the Holocaust and using theatre to bring these stories to life.McEwan noted that as literature becomes complex, adolescents tend to struggle with comprehension and may forgo the idea of discovering enjoyment.2 Incorporating nonfiction stories from the Holocaust with innovative theatre experiences of the literature into the curriculum can engage students in literature with complex themes, characters, and plots. This is especially true when the learning is assessed by using projects developed by, with, and for young adolescents. As a result, the literature becomes comprehensible, accessible, relevant, enjoyable, and aesthetically stimulating.As an educator, researcher, and artistic director of a theatre for young adults, I reflect on the charge by Snow and Biancarosa that educators need to "figure out how to ensure that every student gets beyond the basic literacy skills of the early-elementary grades, to the more challenging and more rewarding literacy of the middle and secondary school years."3 For some students, literacy bridges are gateways to new worlds, skills, and possibilities for enjoyment. For students who struggle with reading, those bridges are obstacles they are afraid or even refuse to cross because of past fears or failures. Even with guidance and support, many students will stop reading when the text becomes complex or never even attempt to read the book when they decide it has no relevancy or purpose after looking at its title, skimming the back, looking for pictures, or counting the pages.This leads to a question and thoughts that inspired my research on using Holocaust literature and theatre to engage young students in discovering, comprehending, visualizing, and aesthetically enjoying the literary experience:• What can be done in the... (shrink)

This review essay emphasizes the distinction between academic art history, based ultimately on the model of scientific research, and the sort that Roberto Calasso practices in his 2009 study Tiepolo in Pink. It is difficult to locate the book's genre, and the reviewer rejects identifying it as a biography (of the sort practiced by Irving Stone, Somerset Maugham, and Dimitri Merejkovski), since Calasso, like most other writers on Tiepolo, stresses how little we know about his personality, which was (...) elusive, and about his private life, which was undramatic. What chiefly interests both Calasso and the reviewer is whether Tiepolo, whose ceiling frescoes are without gravity—their “antigravity” draws the painted figures upward—is an artist without gravitas. The reviewer supports Calasso's argument that the thirty-two etchings comprising the Capricci and Scherzi make it absurd to consider Tiepolo artistically, intellectually, or morally frivolous. “Scientific” art historians have applied the category of “decoration” to these somber etchings, with their incomprehensible allegories, but Calasso, himself an artist (a novelist), approaches these pictures without scientific prejudice. The reviewer traces the dour attitude of mainstream art historians toward Tiepolo to his rivalry for commissions in the 1760s with Anton Raphael Mengs, a representative of the rising Enlightenment cult of virtue and the austere aesthetics of a rising neoclassicism. From that time on, art historians have treated Tiepolo's work as unhealthy, lightweight, and bizarre, but this review supports Calasso's claim that his work is actually sober and moving. The review concludes that there are artists whom the narrow sensibility of standard art historians will never be able to accommodate, Tiepolo being only one among several. (shrink)

Kenneth Burke is, at long last, beginning to get the attention he de- serves. Among anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and rhetori- cians his "dramatism" is increasingly recognized as something that must at least appear in one's index, whether one has troubled to understand him or not. Even literary critics are beginning to see him as not just one more "new critic" but as someone who tried to lead a revolt against "narrow formalism" long before the currently fashionable explosion into the (...) "extrinsic" had been dreamed of. I have recently heard him called a structuralist-before-his-time-and what could be higher praise than that! But in almost everything said about his literary criticism, there is an air of condescension that is puzzling. The tone seems usually to echo that of Rene Wellek , who, as Burke himself laments , "almost overwhelms me with praise," referring to "men of great gifts, nimble powers of combination and association, and fertile imagination," but then deplores Burke's irresponsibility, repudiates his critical judgments, condemns his general method without bothering to look closely at it, and in general makes him look like some sort of idiot savant-a buffoon with a high IQ.Wayne C. Booth received the Phi Beta Kappa Christian Gauss Award in 1962 for his book The Rhetoric of Fiction. His most recent works, A Rhetoric of Irony and Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, appeared this year. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais Revisited" , "M.H. Abrams: Historian as Critic, Critic as Pluralist" , "THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM: 'Preserving the Exemplar': Or, How Not to Dig our Own Graves" , "CRITICAL RESPONSE: Notes and Exchanges" , "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation" ,"Ten Literal 'Theses" , with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction: A Conversation" , and with Robert E. Streeter and W.J.T. Mitchell: "EDITORS' NOTE: Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 124-137 [Access article in PDF] Katz's Problematic Dualism and Its "Seismic" Effects on His Theory Wayne Ouderkirk There is much to admire in Eric Katz's Nature as Subject. 1 Many aspects of his theory strongly resonate with dominant themes in environmental ethics and with my own theoretical predilections. In addition, he applies his theory to several major environmental issues (ecological restoration and (...) the Amazon rainforest, to name two), simultaneously testing it against other views and tracing out its implications. Impressive, non-ivory tower philosophizing. The array of issues he covers is impressive too, from the place of animal rights in an environmental ethic to the relation between environmental destruction and genocide; from the tension between holism and the rights of individuals to intrinsic value; from anthropo- centrism to Judaism and the environment; from the history of environmental thought to the convergence hypothesis. And more.In light of this tremendous range and of my own attraction to such of his major themes as ecocentrism, it might seem unappreciative to criticize, [End Page 124] to dissent. But despite all the positives I find in Katz's writings, I also find faults there, faults which, when pressed, cause major fissures in the whole. The central, major problem is Katz's dualism; and I think it ultimately undoes his whole theory, since it is so intimately connected with the other parts. Within Katz's own essays, there are, I think, resources to begin a reconstruction; but as with any other such effort, the first task is to discard the parts that are no longer useable. Before doing so, however, I want to review some positive aspects of Katz's theory, lest I convey the mistaken impression that my initial praise for his work is mere courtesy. The Solid Geological Features To begin with the most general: Katz's concern for, commitment to the natural world is obvious to any reader. He suffuses every essay with a determination to seek out clear and cogent philosophical rationales for its protection. More important perhaps is his obvious personal connection to that world. His references to Fire Island's deer and beaches, for example, amply demonstrate what the rest of his writings imply: that his theoretical efforts are more than armchair musings about a current philosophical issue. Katz's efforts are both professional and passionate.On a more specifically philosophical level, I regard his anti-anthropocentrism as a significant strength. Though one can, of course, be an anthropocentrist and be an environmental philosopher—Bryan Norton (1984) and Eugene Hargrove (1989) come to mind—I think Katz's arguments showing that anthropocentric views can only offer contingent justifications for protecting the environment are cogent and valid (3-11). An important part of those arguments is Katz's demonstration that different theories in environmental philosophy do indeed result in different environmental policies. In other words, Katz offers a strong counterargument to Norton's convergence hypothesis (Norton 1991), the idea that, given environmentalists' shared commitment to the environment, the various philosophical theories offered in justification of that commitment will converge on similar policy recommendations (149 ff.). I agree with Katz's refutation of that hypothesis, and I offer my critique of his theory because I think that theory's faults will ultimately undermine sound policies.Another big asset of Katz's theory is his communitarianism, the idea that we are part of an ecological community, an ecosystem, to which we have moral obligations. Not surprisingly to anyone familiar with environmental ethics, the source of this idea is Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic (Leopold 1966), [End Page 125] which has been debated, analyzed, praised, and critiqued more than extensively in the literature. Katz pretends to no originality here; he simply adopts and vigorously defends an ecocentric ethic that counts the integrity, stability, and beauty of the system—including, not incidentally, abiotic components—as central criteria limiting human interference with nature. Unlike, for example, the total ecocentrism of J. Baird Callicott's (1980) early writing, however, Katz tempers his communitarianism with another dimension, qualifying his holistic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 693 between the world of our sense perception and the world of objects "in and for themselves," had suggested that the failure to appreciate this distinction was a "Grundvorurteil" common to all controversies, and, finally, had argued for the need to distinguish between the self revealed in "inner sense" and the self as it is in itself, unknowable to us. In his extremely valuable article, "Funzioni logiche (...) e categorie in Kant," Silvestro Marcucci retlects on a complex of issues surrounding Kant's claim to have discovered some sort of correspondence between the components and structure of a "table" of logical functions and those of a set of"pure concepts" or "categories" for the objective determination of objects through the contents of human sensibility. Of central concern to Marcucci is the error of supposing that what is in question is either a mere parallel between functions of judgment and categories or some sort of real identity between them. What is in question, according to Marcucci, are three "uses" but only two "levels" (piani): the foundational level is that of an operative.judgmental "functionality" by which the categories and the pure forms of general logic are produced. He argues that Kant is appealing here neither to pure logical form nor to logical "functions" that are in some way identical with the categories of understanding, but rather to functions of judgment more fundamental than either. The final two essays deal with two of Kant's immediate heirs, Reinhold and Fichte. In "The Sun of Enlightenment" Nathan Rotenstreich argues that Reinhold's notion of Enlightenment had an important social aspect, which is concerned with the distribution of enlightenment and is distinguished from his systematic view. Claudio Cesa, in "Die Vieldeutigkeit des Begriffes 'Trieb' von J. G. Fichte" traces the development of this important concept from Reinhold's concept "Kraft," which was itself neither sensible nor intellectual but changed depending upon its objects: sensibility, understanding, or reason. Cesa goes on to outline how Fichte developed a more positive notion including the conception of inner purposiveness expressing itself in humans as a form for realizing the I. JANE KNELI.ER Colorado State University RICHARD AQUILA University of Tennessee George J. Seidel. Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" of z 794: A Commentary on Part I. Purdue University Series in the History of Philosophy. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993. Pp. ix + 126. Cloth, $25.00. Paper, $12.95. The recent revival of interest in Fichte is now well entrenched in North America and has begun to yield a fairly diverse harvest: new translations, articles, monographs, and, predictably, conferences and a scholarly society. With this volume, however, we have the first entry in the "commentary" category. Given its notorious obscurity and disarray, Fichte's corpus--particularly his Jena corpus, which has remained the main focus of attention--would seem to be an apt subject for the genre. The work to which Seidel has 694 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 devoted his attention--the Foundations of the Entire "Wissenschaft~lehre"--particularly invites this sort of undertaking; it is a text which, by Fichte's own account, was intended to be accompanied by elaborations, illustrations and explanations. Seidel focuses on what is certainly the most interesting and important part of the text, the first three sections (about 3~ pages in all) which together make up "Part I" of this version of the Wissenschaftslehre. It is here that Fichte tries to articulate the basic principles that will govern his entire philosophical investigation. He uses as the lever for his enquiry two fundamental logical dicta--the principles of identity and contradiction--claiming to uncover three fundamental principles which underlie them: the principles of selfpositing, counter-positing and limitation. The body of the Wissenschaflslehreitself is an elaborate dialectical attempt to work out the implications of these basic features of human subjectivity--in particular to use them to give a deduction of the fundamental categories of human experience. There are a number of different approaches that a commentary might take to this dense piece of text. At one extreme stands the example provided by Findlay, whose commentary on Hegel's Phenomenology takes the form of a detailed paraphrase... (shrink)

"In this outstanding and ambitious book, Ranasinghe argues powerfully that Plato's Apology has to be read in the light of Euthyphro, and that we can understand the implications Plato saw in Socrates' trail by studying the Crito in the light of those 'earlier' dialogues. It is essential reading for all with an interest in the 'last days of Socrates,' and will change the views of anyone who reads it." --Back cover.

As clinical ethics consultants move toward professionalization, the process of certifying individual consultants or accrediting programs will be discussed and debated. With certification, some entity must be established or ordained to oversee the standards and procedures. If the process evolves like other professions, it seems plausible that it will eventually include a written examination to evaluate the core knowledge competencies that individual practitioners should possess to meet peer practice standards. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has published core (...) knowledge competencies for many years that are accepted by experts as the prevailing standard. Probably any written examination will be based upon the ASBH core knowledge competencies. However, much remains to be done before any examination may be offered. In particular, it seems likely that a recognized examining board must create and validate examination questions and structure the examination so as to establish meaningful, defensible parameters after dealing with such challenging questions as: Should the certifying examination be multiple choice or short-answer essay? How should the test be graded? What should the pass rate be? How may the examination be best administered? To advance the field of health care ethics consultation, thought leaders should start to focus on the written examination possibilities, to date unaddressed carefully in the literature. Examination models—both objective and written—must be explored as a viable strategy about how the field of health care ethics consultations can grow toward professionalization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.2 (2002) 185-193 [Access article in PDF] Vexing Nature? On the Ethical Case against Agricultural Biotechnology, by Gary L. Comstock. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer, 2000. Pp. 297. Hardback; no softcover listed $99.95. ISBN 0-7923-7987-X. Since its origins some ten millennia ago, agriculture has shaped culture. In our own era, that shaping has become less visible, perhaps less significant, perhaps even reversed. But whatever agriculture's relationship to the (...) larger culture, there is no surprise that, in a technological era, it has become a magnet for technological development, and now especially for biotechnology. Dramatic changes in such a fundamental social practice raise far-reaching social, moral, and, in this case, environmental questions, most of them complex and controversial. Things change rapidly; and as new processes, products, and information become available, evaluations of the technology can change.After opposing agricultural biotechnology for almost a decade, Gary Comstock revised his views. That Comstock openly documents his change of mind regarding ag biotech (his abbreviated name for it) is admirable, and the idea of tracking such a reversal in a book is appealing. But this book has a number of flaws that limit its contribution. One set of problems [End Page 185] has to do with the way Comstock presents his reversal (the overall structure of the book). Another set is the weaknesses in some of his key arguments. Still another is the production dimension of the book itself. Together, these imperfections result in the book's not living up to its promise.Before explaining my complaints, however, I want to offer some praise. Scattered throughout the book are stories about Comstock and his family and how their experiences led him to reflect on the issues. Explaining his use of stories as integral to his presentation, he observes that ethics is not an abstract exercise but requires acknowledging "the rich social contexts in which our problems arise" (p. 7). I wholeheartedly agree. The stories also reveal his personal passion for the issues he analyzes, and I wish he had provided more of them.Anyone wanting access to the literature on agricultural ethics could use Comstock's discussions and chapter notes as an entree. Moreover, his references to pertinent scientific, technological, and agricultural studies are extensive and demonstrate impressive grasp of non-philosophical topics. To mention but one example: the history of agricultural herbicide use. Although some of the chapters were originally published eight or more years ago, the more recent chapters refer to fresher scientific material; and the earlier publications have value for understanding the historical path of the various controversies.Discussions concerning ethics and biotechnology often focus on impacts on humans or the environment. Comstock is concerned with both of those, but also with the treatment of agricultural animals, an issue central to an adequate agricultural ethic. So his grappling with it is a positive feature.Finally, in the last two chapters Comstock reviews and evaluates almost every conceivable argument against ag biotech, dividing them into "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" arguments—that is, arguments that ag biotech is in itself objectionable, and arguments that its consequences are too dangerous to justify its practice. Proponents of such arguments will disagree with some of his formulations and evaluations of them. However, having most, if not all, of them in one place, along with some critical commentary, is a convenience for those who want to review the possible positions in this continuing debate.Many readers would like to know why a thinker changed views about a significant ethical issue and what was the trajectory of experience, thought, [End Page 186] and ideas leading to and cementing that change. From the outset, we know that Comstock reversed his position on ag biotech; but not until the last two chapters does he fully explain the arguments and experiences that changed his mind. So readers must first work through his earlier, critical views about ag biotech. That exercise is not without value; but with only a few summary statements of the deciding factors to go on, one is left in the dark about which... (shrink)

This chapter will review selected aspects of the terrain of discussions about probabilities in statistical mechanics (with no pretensions to exhaustiveness, though the major issues will be touched upon), and will argue for a number of claims. None of the claims to be defended is entirely original, but all deserve emphasis. The first, and least controversial, is that probabilistic notions are needed to make sense of statistical mechanics. The reason for this is the same reason that convinced Maxwell, Gibbs, (...) and Boltzmann that probabilities would be needed, namely, that the second law of thermodynamics, which in its original formulation says that certain processes are impossible, must, on the kinetic theory, be replaced by a weaker formulation according to which what the original version deems impossible is merely improbable. Second is that we ought not take the standard measures invoked in equilibrium statistical mechanics as giving, in any sense, the correct probabilities about microstates of the system. We can settle for a much weaker claim: that the probabilities for outcomes of experiments yielded by the standard distributions are effectively the same as those yielded by any distribution that we should take as a representing probabilities over microstates. Lastly, (and most controversially): in asking about the status of probabilities in statistical mechanics, the familiar dichotomy between epistemic probabilities (credences, or degrees of belief) and ontic (physical) probabilities is insufficient; the concept of probability that is best suited to the needs of statistical mechanics is one that combines epistemic and physical considerations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker?s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial (...) injustice in such terms, I argue that the fundamental wrong done in acts of testimonial injustice is a form of negligence. Once we understand testimonial injustice in this way, it is easier to see when and why we are culpable for perpetrating such injustices. Indeed, explicitly recognizing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence solves several problems for Fricker?s view, which are elucidated briefly along the way. However, construing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence has a cost as well. It highlights the fact that the normative core of Fricker?s view is deontological, rather than virtue-theoretic. Fricker claims to be offering a theory of the virtue of testimonial justice along the model of current virtue theories in epistemology, yet it seems that there is no compelling reason to think of what she has offered as a virtue theory, at least not on the model of virtue theories that one finds in epistemology. This is not to say that her view is any less plausible for not being a virtue theory. But calling it a virtue theory affects how one interprets its various claims, and tends to lead one away from, rather than toward, a proper understanding of the deep deontological nature of her account. (shrink)

Like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, the current international monetary crisis—bank failures and a collapse of markets worldwide—was not sufficiently predictable to preempt with defensive action. One would think that history's experiences with sudden breakdowns in global economics would have taught the modern world enough lessons to assure that economic intelligence would have tightened the reins of investors and speculators over the last decade of runaway optimism. But history has never been a good teacher—better said, people have rarely been good (...) students of history's lessons in cause and effect. Still, it makes sense, as with this essay, that we look back on such financial follies of the past, as epitomized by Holland's tulipmania, and take comfort in finding that our follies are just enough different from historical ones to at least claim them as our very own. (shrink)

Wayne Martin and colleagues argue that decisions about patients’ best interests must sometimes take into account the interests of others Doctors often find themselves in circumstances where they must make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient. As a matter of both ethics and law, such decisions must be taken in the best interests of the patient, but uncertainty remains about what is meant by best interests, especially in relation to the interests of others. Should the (...) interests of others enter into a determination of the patient’s best interests? We believe that they should and argue against a recent trend to focus solely on the patient. It only takes a moment’s reflection to appreciate that the interests of one person are often wrapped up with the interests of others. A patient has an interest in recovering from her illness, but so do her family, employer, care providers, etc. Sometimes these various interests can be independently specified, but in other cases they are inextricably intertwined. Suppose that I am a single parent whose overriding interest is to ensure the wellbeing of my children. In that case the proper specification of my best interest is a function of theirs; I simply cannot determine the one without considering the other. This can create an ethical problem in medical decision making. In circumstances where medical staff must make a decision in the best interests of an incapacitated patient, to what extent can or should they take account of the interests of other people whose lives are affected by the outcome? These ethical issues have taken on a concrete legal shape in the UK with the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which specifies that, “An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity …. (shrink)

Harvey Brown’s Physical Relativity defends a view, the dynamical perspective, on the nature of spacetime that goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of substantivalist/relationist views. A full defense of this view requires attention to the way that our use of spacetime concepts connect with the physical world. Reflection on such matters, I argue, reveals that the dynamical perspective affords the only possible view about the ontological status of spacetime, in that putative rivals fail to express anything, either true or false. (...) I conclude with remarks aimed at clarifying what is and isn’t in dispute with regards to the explanatory priority of spacetime and dynamics, at countering an objection raised by John Norton to views of this sort, and at clarifying the relation between background and effective spacetime structure. (shrink)

When M. H. Abrams published a defense, in 1972, of "theorizing about the arts,"1 some of his critics accused him, of falling into subjectivism. He had made his case so forcefully against "the confrontation model of aesthetic criticism," and so effectively argued against "simplified" and "invariable" models of the art work and of "the function of criticism," that some readers thought he had thrown overboard the very possibility of a rational criticism tested by objective criteria. In his recent reply (...) to these critics,2 Abrams concentrates almost entirely on whether his critical pluralism is finally a skeptical relativism. He does not even mention his great historical works, The Mirror and the Lamp and Natural Supernaturalism, and he has nothing to say about how his pluralistic theories would be applied to the writing of history. But then, surprising as it seems once we think about it, neither of the two histories has much about his method either. What is the true achievement of these aggressive raids into our past, and how does Abrams see them in relation to other possible histories of the same subjects? Knowing in advance that he has agreed to reply to my nudging, I should like both to propose that everyone has—with Abrams' own encouragement—understated the importance of what he has done and to ask: What kind of pluralist is he? · 1. "What's the Use of Theorizing about the Arts," In Search of Literary Theory, ed. Morton Bloomfield , pp. 3-54. · 2. "A Note on Wittgenstein and Literary Criticism," ELH 41 : 541-54. Wayne C. Booth's other contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing" , "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais Revisited" , >"Preserving the Exemplar: Or, How Not to Dig our Own Graves" , "Notes and Exchanges" , "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation" ,"Ten Literal 'Theses" , with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction: A Conversation" , and with Robert E. Streeter, W.J.T. Mitchell: “Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent work, Scott Soames has declared that we need a new conception of propositions to overcome critical objections to traditional theories of semantics and propositional attitudes. Propositions must be cognitive to account for their inherent intentionality, structure, and epistemic accessibility, and to overcome Frege’s and Russell’s problems. I have previously worked out a foundational semantics in which cognitive propositions are what sentences express. My objective in this paper is to identify some of the limitations of Soames’s theory, (...) and show how they can be overcome within the cognitive framework. Soames’s conception of propositions is needlessly encumbered by identifying them with acts rather than objects. Soames has not fully exploited the possibilities opened up by embracing cognitive propositions, and is still too attached to Russellian propositions and Millian semantics. As a result, his conception of the constituents of propositions is untenable, and his semantics still faces Frege’s and Russell’s problem, which are easily avoidable with the resources of cognitive propositions. Soames was led astray by a mistaken assumption about transparent attitude reports. (shrink)

The use of ‘S knows p’ varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: ‘S knows p’ is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber’s context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguistic evidence against contextualism is extensive. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims results from pragmatic factors. One is variable strictness (Davis, Philos Stud, 132(3):395–438, 2007). In addition to its strict use, (...) ‘S knows p’ may be used loosely to implicate that S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes. Here I explore another variable: belief about what is known. This factor is pragmatic rather than semantic in that it affects the use of ‘S knows p’ without affecting its truth conditions. While variation in strictness accounts for the variation in the bank, parking, and some lottery cases, variation in belief accounts for the variation in other lottery cases and the epistemology cases. Along the way, I sketch an insensitive invariantist semantics that is strict but non-skeptical, and show how it works with these pragmatic factors. (shrink)

At first I thought Richard Berrong’s claim was only that I had misread Rabelais. My main point was not about Rabelais but about how, in general, we might deal with sexist classics. But it remains true that if Berrong has caught me misreading—and then condemning—“bits” torn from their context, I have violated my own professed standards. He and I both see Rabelais as a very great author, and we both hope to avoid the pointlessness of judging works, great (...) or small, for faults that they do not exhibit. But I am not certain whether we agree that when, after careful reading, we find that a beloved author is in some way insensitive or unjust, we will want somehow to include that judgment in what we say about the author’s genius. When I consider his conclusion closely, I begin to suspect that we are engaged in a dispute not about Rabelais but about whether we are free to appraise a literary work in terms other than “its own.”I shall not attempt a detailed answer to the claim that I have misread Rabelais. Even if I chanced to persuade Berrong—an unlikely outcome now, since my long article failed to win him—we can be sure that many other modern readers would rise up to call Rabelais inoffensive. Disputes about his treatment of women have continued for more than four centuries, and they are not likely ever to be finally settled. So I shall just touch on four of our contrasting readings and then turn to the more important matter of how we view ethical criticism. Wayne Booth’s most recent book is Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism. A version of his critique of Rabelais will appear this year in The Company We Keep: Ethical Criticism and the Ethics of Reading. (shrink)

Fifty years after the publication of Bell's theorem, there remains some controversy regarding what the theorem is telling us about quantum mechanics, and what the experimental violations of Bell inequalities are telling us about the world. This chapter represents my best attempt to be clear about what I think the lessons are. In brief: there is some sort of nonlocality inherent in any quantum theory, and, moreover, in any theory that reproduces, even approximately, the (...) quantum probabilities for the outcomes of experiments. But not all forms of nonlocality are the same; there is a distinction to be made between action at a distance and other forms of nonlocality, and I will argue that the nonlocality required to violate the Bell inequalities need not involve action at a distance. Furthermore, the distinction between forms of nonlocality makes a difference when it comes to compatibility with relativistic causal structure. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig's book, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Kvanvig, 2003), is a wonderful example of doing epistemology in a style that Kvanvig himself has termed "value−driven epistemology." On this approach, one takes questions about epistemic value to be central to theoretical concerns, including the concern to provide an adequate account of knowledge. This approach yields the demand that theories of knowledge must provide, not just an adequate account of the nature of knowledge, but also an (...) account of the value of knowledge. Given the near−universal assumption that knowledge has a special kind of value, this demand seems reasonable, though surprisingly hard to satisfy. Another consequence of this approach to doing epistemology is that certain assumptions about epistemic value, like what sorts of things have it and what sorts of things don't, and where such value comes from, become much more salient to the epistemic enterprise. In his book, Kvanvig challenges the assumption that knowledge has some unique store of epistemic value. And he investigates the matter by asking questions about what the bearers of epistemic value are and where they get it. He concludes, of course, that knowledge as we have come to conceive it in 21st century epistemology has no such special value. (shrink)

In Truth in Aquinas Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank continue Radical Orthodoxy's ‘reinterpretation’ of the history of philosophy and theology by evaluating philosophy as metaphysics so that ‘metaphysics collapses into sacra doctrina’ in Thomas Aquinas. Their strategy for saving Aquinas from Heideggerian ‘onto‐theology’ is the opposite of that Jean‐Luc Marion who in ‘Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto‐théo‐logie’ keeps philosophy and metaphysics distinct from sacred teaching. The article examines some of the questions involved by reconsidering the nature of philosophy as textual (...) commentary in late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. It goes on to examine what Aquinas means by ‘the truth of things’, and concludes by looking at how he treats the aspects of metaphysics and the relation of metaphysics and sacra doctrina. Hankey judges that Marion is right on this question. The author suggests that what is involved with Milbank and Pickstock is not a reinterpretation of Aquinas. What they have written depends on mistakes and misrepresentations of basic points in his teaching, e.g, participation, intellectual intuition and abstractions, God's being and his existence in things, with the result that Thomas looks more like Descartes or Spinoza than himself. (shrink)

An application and confirmation of the thesis of my book, "Kant's Model of the Mind", that, for Kant, space and time exist only in and for imagination, and the given of sense is atemporal and aspatial (=transcendental idealism). On previous interpretations of transcendental idealism, appearances already have temporal and spatial existence; on mine, they lack such existence, and the purpose of the Analogies is to show how they originally acquire it. Existence in space and time is constituted by a priori (...) principles of necessary connection (the Analogies), whose validity with respect to appearances is grounded on the demand for original apperception (i.e., a synthetic unitary sensibility). The implications vis-à-vis Kant's metaphysics of nature and his Euclideanism are then explored. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall argue that the most moderate and balanced way to view Kant's transcendental philosophy is as a species of psychological investigation analogous to Hume's, but refounded on a doctrine of pure sensibility, such as Hume never allowed himself . This might seem to fly in the face of what many interpreters of Kant deem conventional wisdom: that the burden of proof is on one who claims that psychology is essential to transcendental philosophy. On this view, (...) there is to be found in Kant ‘a more austere strictly transcendental philosophy’, which needs to be carefully distinguished from the psychological doctrines in which it is enmeshed; and they would insist on being convinced of the contrary before abandoning a position that, in their eyes, is the most moderate and balanced an interpreter of Kant can adopt. My purpose in this two-part essay is to urge them to think again. For while there can be no question of Kant's opposition to empiricism, it is equally certain that his praise for Hume was never freer or more unreserved than in respect of the latter's psycho-genetic approach to cognition. So, rather than supposing that Kant ipso facto rejected solutions to philosophical problems grounded on psychology when he rejected Hume's empiricism, it seems to me that the more moderate and balanced interpretive approach is to begin by supposing that Kant's transcendental philosophy is a species of philosophical psychology in the same mould as Hume's, differing from it only by virtue of involving a priori syntheses of a manifold of a priori intuition. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century the tropes of messianism, apocalypse and redemption, which had been so central to the West's religious formation, seemed spent forces in Germany. Nietzsche had pronounced God as dead and theology seemed to be travelling the same secular route as philosophy. But World War I changed that. This book introduces some of Germany's key thinkers in theology, philosophy, literature and social and political thought through their engagement with these previously discarded concepts. They initiated a (...) new and urgent dialogue between philosophy and theology. This imaginative and innovative collection brings together essays by established scholars on Messiamism, Redemption and Apocalypse in twentieth century German thought. Major theologians such as Barth, Buber, Bonhoeffer, Rahner, Pannenberg and Moltmann are discussed alongside leading intellectuals such as Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Heiddeger and Rosenzweig. Literary figures, such as Kafka and George, are also included. The interfaces imply a different way of reading theology and challenge the reader to think what the implications of immanence in a specific philosophical culture are for the theological project. Some of the essays introduce thinkers who are little known to English speaking readers. Others cast new light on more familiar figures. The collection as a whole contextualises German religious and philosophical thought on these crucial topics in very useful ways. The dialogue at work in these pages is a very important one and should be carried further. (shrink)

The authors of this essay challenge the notion that “philosophy” is irredeemably Eurocentric by providing a series of personal, professional, and pedagogical reflections on their experience in a new graduate seminar on “Indigenous philosophy.” The authors—a graduate student, professor, and Indigenous course-facilitator—share in the fashion of “Indigenous storywork,” as outlined by Stó:lō pedagogue Jo-Ann Archibald. We begin with the instructor and how he was personally challenged to re-evaluate his roots and philosophical praxis in spite of his experience teaching over (...) several decades. The second section describes a student experience and how they measured the exigencies of decolonization against the esteem that their family holds for Canada’s brand of multiculturalism. Finally, we turn to the Indigenous seminar facilitator and his skepticism over whether the course truly constituted decolonized, or “landed,” pedagogy. Throughout, the authors ask about the demands of decolonization and how philosophical pedagogy may center Indigenous futurity. (shrink)

Fichte’s introduction to the Sittenlehre rather strikingly says nothing about Sitten or Sittlichkeit, nothing about Moral, virtually nothing about die Ethik. Aside from one very pregnant promissory note with no immediate bearing on ethical matters, it says nothing about the specific tasks and strategy of the book it introduces. What it provides instead is a concise statement of Fichte’s fundamental philosophical commitments and a powerful illustration of his distinctive combination of transcendental and phenomenological approaches in (...) philosophy in general and to the problems of action in particular. In approaching Fichte’s text we will do well to focus on three points: the systematic place of the text in Fichte’s corpus and in his system; Fichte’s sketch of the phenomenology and transcendental conditions of agency; and the problem of understanding the distinctive normativity of Fichte’s transcendental/phenomenological laws. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Our Best RhetorologistWayne C. BoothAristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character, by Eugene Garver; 328 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, $53.95.Eugene Garver’s new book is not only an original and challenging account of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It is one of the fullest and most responsible encounters ever with philosophical, political, and ethical issues raised by the theory and practice of rhetoric. I’ll go even further. Because Garver grapples so (...) well with how Aristotle’s problems differ from ours, and how his solutions do not quite fit what we most need, I hereby confer upon him, without irony, the title of supreme “rhetorologist” (a term he needs but does not use).A rhetorologist is not just “rhetorician” or “rhetorical theorist” or “philosopher of rhetoric.” Garver’s work dramatizes our need for a term for the “comparativist of rhetorics,” the thinker who probes how disparate rhetorical practices and theories compete and are finally, inescapably related. In earlier times when all philosophers were trained to think about rhetoric the term “genuine philosopher” might have served the trick. But it won’t work today.Garver has spent decades on this masterwork of rhetorology, and he thus joins those rare masters-of-interrelated-rhetorics—Kenneth Burke, Richard McKeon, who else?—those who do justice both to the importance and the complexities of a subject that Aristotle has led us into but himself could never have dreamed of, since he had available no fully developed alternative “rhetorics” to do a “-logy” on. [End Page 116]The book is too ambitious and complex to allow full justice here. It is a book not just to read but to study; it is a book to teach from. All attentive readers will find themselves drawn into issues previously dodged, or engaged in quarrels about theses they’ve never met before. Those like me whose interests overlap strongly with Garver’s will of course dispute about some points. What will prove important, as the book gets discussed, will be our recognition of just why the project itself has led Garver, and leads us, into some inescapable juggling with several different and potentially contradictory theses, each of them so important that it must at moments have invited Garver to consider it as primary. Indeed, when an original thinker bites off more than anyone can chew, let alone fully digest, we should not be surprised if we have a hard time deciding just what the main point is. Several times in my first reading I thought, “Garver has mistitled this book: it should be called...”—and then I’d try out a title that fit the argument at that point but would not fit precisely what came next.The result is that different sympathetic readers will find different books here, with at least the following ambiguously related purposes—all of them to my mind either firmly achieved or at least pursued so effectively that refutation will prove difficult. Some of them are the overt theses of particular chapters, but all are found echoed or implied in every chapter. And all are finally and impressively interrelated.IFirst, Garver works, as he must, to show the faults of past readings of the Rhetoric. The chief of these has been the reduction to a handbook for rhetors; it is not a technical handbook, though it can be used as that, but an effort to “construct a civic relation between argument and ethos, so between techn̄e and phron̄esis [prudence]” (p. 77). “Aristotle’s political project is to maximize the active—energeia—side of rhetoric and so civilize the activity of influencing beliefs and judgments and convert into a minor irritant the role played by disreputable tactics such as playing on irrelevant emotions in the hearers” (p. 40). “I have... assumed that instead of doing that job [the ‘handbook’ job] badly, Aristotle is in fact trying to accomplish something else. I see him exhibiting the internal values and standards of rhetorical argument to legislators and citizens” (p. 235), [and thus making possible] “a new conception of the ethical, and of the relation of logos and ethos” (p. 16). “Aristotle’s Rhetoric is about a civic art... (shrink)

It is strange to write for the pages of this journal a statement which will not come under the eye of its founding editor, Sheldon Sacks. For nearly five years everything that appeared in Critical Inquiry—articles, critical responses, editorial comments—was a matter of painstaking and passionate concern to Shelly Sacks. With a flow of questions and suggestions and a talent for unabashed cajolery, he generated articles and rejoinders to those articles. He worked tirelessly in editorial consultation and correspondence with contributors, (...) especially young writers, helping them to discover the best way of giving form to their ideas. Among the essays submitted to this journal he searched eagerly, even anxiously, for those which seemed, in his words, "right for C.I." What was right for C. I. was never, for Shelly Sacks, a cut-and-dried choice. In his own intellectual life, in his teaching and writing, he delighted in arguing important general questions: theories of representation in the arts, points of possible intersection between linguistic science and literary criticism, the interplay of social forces and cultural expressions. Not surprisingly, in reconnoitering for Critical Inquiry, he found special satisfaction in identifying writers who shared his passion for reexamining fundamental topics in the intellectual disciplines. If such writers made their case forcefully, so much the better: in choosing an essay for publication he assessed its capacity to stimulate interesting counterargument. At no time, however, did Shelly Sacks confuse his own beliefs with the nature of intellectual discourse. As an editor he was hospitable to writers whose premises he questioned and whose conclusions he deplored. Nor did Shelly attempt to achieve a spurious catholicity by following a quiet quota system designed to give each major line of interpretation—deconstructionist, Marxist, psychoanalytic, what have you—an occasional airing in Critical Inquiry. For Shelly each article stood on its own ground: if its author dealt responsibly and freshly with an interesting problem, that was enough. And, along with his commitment to theoretical inquiry, he responded warmly to the personal, the offbeat, the idiosyncratic. He regarded the feature Artists on Art, for example, as a central element in our design. As an editor Sheldon Sacks was above all a shaper. He labored to find and suggest connections in the phenomena of intellectual life. Even the construction of a table of contents for a typical Critical Inquiry issue became for him an opportunity to influence the reader's experience of what we offered. The eminence of an author or the allure of a title were put to one side as Shelly sought to orchestrate, through placement, a kind of intellectual counterpoint from one essay to another. Unheard melodies, doubtless, for many of us, but for Shelly real and sustaining. In this valedictory note we have spoken of Sheldon Sacks' editorial accomplishment—in our friendly view, a very distinguished one—rather than of the personal qualities which made working alongside him an exhilarating experience. We should report, however, that for more than half the life of this journal Shelly was ill and knew that the time available to him was likely to be relatively brief. Faced with this diminishing perspective, he did not—indeed it is more accurate to say he could not—moderate his involvement with the life of this journal. At his death, as at the launching of this enterprise, he held to the high ambition that Critical Inquiry encourage comeliness, vigor, and continuity in the discourse of our time. The appropriate "critical response" to this great loss is that Sheldon Sacks’ editorial colleagues, and our publisher, the University of Chicago Press, pledge whatever talents and energies we possess to the continuing life of the journal he imagined and brought into being. (shrink)

In this brilliant assessment of the relation between poststructuralism and feminism to current religious thought, philosopher of religion Carol Wayne White convincingly demonstrates that postmodernist continental and feminist philosophies—far from being antithetical to religious concerns—in fact enrich our understanding of religion and its relevance to debates about contemporary culture. By triangulating these three unique perspectives on culture she expands prevailing views of cultural criticism and opens up the discussion to new creative solutions that arise from the intersecting interests (...) of poststructuralist, feminist, and religious studies. Dividing her work into three major sections, White first summarizes the major developments in postmodern and feminist thought in a lucid and refreshingly jargon-free exposition. Next she focuses on two major thinkers in poststructuralist religious scholarship—Sharon Welch and Mark C. Taylor—showing how their work incorporates, on the one hand, Foucault's political critique of power and, on the other, Derrida's textual deconstruction. Finally, she looks at feminist critiques of culture with special emphasis on feminists' contributions to the study of religion. She concludes by highlighting the important role of religious valuing in providing an impetus to action and pragmatic social change. Religion can and should move us beyond the stalemate of postmodern critiques with their often-nihilistic undertones and fruitless academic posturing. Poststructuralism, Feminism, and Religion succeeds in elucidating what it means to think and act religiously in the postmodern era. (shrink)

Behind the playful title of this book there is a serious theory about the origin of religions, as well as an argument concerning their usefulness and the truth claims they make. Anyone familiar with Shults's work will recognize this book as a companion to his Theology after the Birth of God—and, to a lesser extent, Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism—repeating the basic argument but adding an avalanche of more recent research, engaging some different interlocutors, and (...) outlining the virtues of computer modeling as an avenue of inquiry.1 The first and last chapters detail the core of Shults's theory and the evidence for it; the inner ten... (shrink)

This book is written for individuals who want to learn about the philosophical foundations of political and economic freedom. It is an introduction and a guide to the principal theoretical ideas on liberty produced by the most influential and creative thinkers in history, with chapters on Adam Smith, Ludwig von Mises, and Carl Menger.

In turning to the language of freedom, I am not automatically freed from the dangers of reduction and self-privileging. "Freedom" as a term is at least as ambiguous as "power" . When I say that for me all questions about the politics of interpretation begin with the question of freedom, I can either be saying a mouthful or saying nothing at all, depending on whether I am willing to complicate my key term, "freedom," by relating it to the language (...) of power. The best way to do that is to get power in from the beginning, by making a distinction taken for granted by many earlier thinkers and too often ignored today: freedom from as contrasted with freedom to; freedom from external restraints and the power of others to inhibit our actions, and freedom to act effectively when restraints disappear.All the freedom from in the world will not free me to make an intellectual discovery or to point a picture unless I have somehow freed myself to perform certain tasks. Such freedoms are gained only by those who surrender to disciplines and codes invented by others, giving up certain freedoms from. Nobody forbids by interpreting the original text of Confucius' Analects or the Principia Mathematica, yet I am not free to do so, lacking the disciplines—having not been disciplined—to do so. The distinction can lead to troublesome complexities, but in its simple form here it cuts through some of the problems that arise in power language.Every critical revolution tends to speak more clearly about what it is against than about what it seeks. The historicists against impressionism, the New Critics against historicism, the new new critics against intentionalism and the authority of canons, the feminists against misogynous art and criticism–clearly one could write a history of modern criticism as a glorious casting off of errors. But it is rightly a commonplace among intellectual historians that all revolutionaries depend on their past far more than they know. Revolutionary critics are enslaved by a nasty law of nature: I can say only what I can say, and that will be largely what I have learned to say from the kings I would depose.Everyone who tries to forge any kind of ideological criticism must struggle with these complexities. Nobody ever knows just what powers have been rejected and what voices heard. But at the moment it seems clear that what follows here, both in its emerging clarities and remaining confusions, results from my somewhat surprised surrender to voices previously alien to me: the "Mikhail Bakhtin" who speaks to me, muffled by my ignorance of Russian, and the feminist criticism" that in its vigor and diversity and challenge to canonic views has—belatedly, belatedly—forced me to begin listening.Wayne C. Booth's most recent work, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism, won the Laing Prize in 1982. He is working on a book about ethical and political criticism of narrative. A new edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction will appear in 1983. (shrink)

"This important and well-executed collection provides evidence of both the diversity of Booths interests and the consistency of his thought. It will appeal to a substantial audience of Boothophiles, rhetoricians, literary critics and theorists, and students of religion."---James Phelan, Ohio State University, author of Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration "The Knowing Most Worth Doing simultaneously celebrates Booth's career and offers his admirers easy access to significant but difficult-to-find essays. Like most of Booth's (...) best work, it manages to maintain a high intellectual level without requiring specialist knowledge of its readers and exhibits an enviable stylistic ease."---Peter J. Rabinowitz, Hamilton College, author of Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation Throughout the second half of the twentieth century until his death in 2005, Wayne Booth was one of the most influential literary critics in America and beyond, known world-wide for The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), and hailed as a progressive advocate for rethinking the concept of liberal education in a changing world. His many books and essays remain classic reading for those who wish to understand how fiction communicates ethically, why good ethical criticism as such is a signature human activity to be cherished, and how the human desire to know helps to define who we are collectively and individually. In this final volume of Booth's selected essays, appropriately titled The Knowing Most Worth Doing, after Booth's earlier edited collection, The Knowledge Most Worth Having. (1967), Walter Jost, in collaboration with the author, has gathered an indispensable collection of his former teacher's thinking across a wide variety of fields and disciplines, from ethics to religion and from rhetorical criticism to the philosophical plurality of possible critical modes. The selections begin with three diverse, profound discussions of the need for plural perspectives in the contemporary world, proceed to accessible yet learned readings of the ethics of literature, and end with wonderful speculations on the nature of, and human need for, religious thought. Gathered from various journals and books over several decades, these "fugitive" essays will prove their enduring value because they speak frankly and without pretensions to problems that continue to plague us, and to aspirations that continue to draw a new generation into the knowing most worth doing. In these discussions, knowledge is understood as an activity and a way of life, one that can be embraced by all people in many different ways. (shrink)

This collection of essays is dedicated to a recently deceased philosopher and humanist, Nalin Ranasinghe. His central philosophical and humanistic preoccupation was with the human soul. Not surprisingly, his greatest inspiration was Socrates' credo "Care for your soul," and the title of his first book was 'The Soul of Socrates'. In this and his later writings, Ranasinghe expressed his growing concern over the idea that the human soul has been highjacked due to the way our civilization has developed: the (...) highest and noblest aspirations of our civilization have been replaced by our obsession with money, pleasure, and power. We now live in a time where we do not know who we are, nor who the people around us are. Despite all of the technical gadgets connecting us virtually, this is the age of disconnect and loneliness, as well as of the degradations of humanity. Ranasinghe insisted that the two keys for recovery are the self-knowledge of the soul and a continuous dialogue with others. We need to relearn how to relate to ourselves and others as unique individuals, not as objects for the satisfaction of our needs. Following his ideas, the twenty essays presented here are divided into two parts: "the soul in reflection" and "the soul in dialogue." The contributors come from various countries around the globe and work in different disciplines, and their chapters aim to revive our interest in the soul and the obscured core of our humanity. This book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy; however, the essays are written in a non-technical language, also making them accessible to the general audience. (shrink)

Flattering the oracle -- The tyrant's invitation -- A soul turned upside-down -- The Socratic cosmos.

This engagingly humane book traces Plato's struggle to simultaneously understand and convey the erotic presence of Socrates.

Included here are twenty essays from renowned scholars, honoring Stanley Rosen, whose work in ancient and modern philosophy is among the most influential today.

Wayne Waxman here presents an ambitious and comprehensive attempt to link the philosophers of what are known as the British Empiricists--Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--to the philosophy of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Much has been written about all these thinkers, who are among the most influential figures in the Western tradition. Waxman argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Kant is actually the culmination of the British empiricist program and that he shares their methodological assumptions and basic convictions (...) about human thought and knowledge. (shrink)

If the philosophers of the Enlightenment had hoped to establish, once and for all, that reason is the primary source of human orientation, twentieth century philosophy has demonstrated all too clearly that reason is far from having clear boundaries. In this respect, Immanuel Kant's contemporaries and critics, Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, look surprisingly modern. Faith is now increasingly recognized as intrinsic to social identity and thus no more capable of taking a permanently subordinate role to reason--whatever that (...) may be--than reason is capable of an existence free from social embodiment. This collection of thirteen essays focuses upon major philosophical and theological debates from the past three hundred years. Written by leading international scholars, this remarkable text takes the reader through major transitions in the modern understanding of faith and reason. It thus provides an invaluable guide to the history of modern philosophical theology whilst informing readers why the relationship between faith and reason remains an issue of major social and philosophical importance."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

What I am calling for is not as radically new as it may sound to ears that are still tuned to positivist frequencies. A very large part of what we value as our cultural monuments can be thought of as metaphoric criticism of metaphor and the characters who make them. The point is perhaps most easily made about the major philosophies. Stephen Pepper has argued, in World Hypotheses,1 that the great philosophies all depend on one of the (...) four "root metaphors," formism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism, and they are great precisely because they have so far survived the criticism of rival metaphors. Each view of the totality of things claims supremacy, but none has been able to annihilate the others. They all thus survive as still plausible, pending further criticism through further philosophical inquiry. In this view, even the great would-be literalists like Hobbes and Locke are finally metaphorists—simply committed to another kind of metaphor, one that to them seems literal. Without grossly oversimplifying we could say that the whole work of each philosopher amounts to an elaborate critique of the inadequacy of all other philosophers' metaphors. What is more, the very existence of a tradition of a small group of great philosophies is a sign that hundreds of lesser metaphors for the life of mankind have been tested in the great philosophical—that is, critical—wars and found wanting. · 1. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence . In Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis , Pepper suggests that "the purposive act" is a fifth root metaphor. Wayne C. Booth's is the author of, among other works, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing" , "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais Revisited" , "M. H. Abrams: Historian as Critic, Critic as Pluralist" , "'Preserving the Exemplar': Or, How Not to Dig our Own Graves" , "Notes and Exchanges" , with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction: A Conversation" , and with Robert E. Streeter, W. J. T. Mitchell: "Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979". (shrink)

The ambition of this book is a noble one: to provide a counter to the assumption, taken for granted made by many postmodernists, that quantum mechanics lends support to the view that scienti® c realism is nothing more than an outmoded fad. It is especially gratifying that this book comes from a literary theorist, author of a well-respected book on Derrida (Norris, 1987), who, by his own admission, has ª previously published several books on literary theory that might be construed (...) ¼ as going along with the emergent trend towards anti-realism and cultural relativism in various quarters of `advanced’ theoretical debateº (Introduction, p. 1). One wishes, however, that Norris had taken more time to familiarize himself with issues that he writes about, and that he had taken more care in constructing his arguments. Although ª there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentanceº (Luke 15: 7, RSV), we should not let jubilation blind us to the book’ s shortcomings. Among these is a lack of clarity in its central notion, that of realism. Early on, Norris quotes with approval William Alston’ s characterization of the alethic conception of realism, which is the conception advocated by Norris; the alethic conception ª implies that (almost always) what confers a truth-value on a statement is something independent of the cognitive-linguistic goings-on that issued in that statement, including any epistemic status of those goings-onº (p. 41). As the book progresses, however, additional conditions on what is to count as a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics emerge. Realism apparently becomes synonymous with ª causal-explanatoryº theories, and in one passage, Norris goes so far as to suggest that realism entails a commitment to synthetic a priori knowledge of the physical world: Bell’ s calculations and those applied in interpreting the Aspect results are themselves dependentÐ no less than EPRÐ on a range of distinctly ª classicalº assumptions, among them the existence of a physical object-domain which, however puzzling its details, permits such experiments to be carried out and conclusions to be drawn from them.. (shrink)

This essay forms part of an “elegiac symposium” on “what gets lost during paradigm shifts,” and it replies to an earlier contribution to that symposium, “Regarding Change at Ise-Jingu” by Jeffrey M. Perl (14, no. 2 [2008]: 208-20; DOI 10.1215/0961754X-2007-069]) . Andersen argues against or supplements Perl's contention that Japanese attitudes toward change differ radically from those that are standard in the West. Andersen expands on arguments made by Roland Barthes—an explicator and partisan of Japanese thought—to show that (...) at least one Greek myth (that of the unchanging ship Argo) deals with change, originality, updating, fakes, and replication in a way similar to those standard in Japanese culture. Andersen then pursues his argument, as well, with respect to works by Rodin, Sade, and Leonardo da Vinci. (shrink)

The first edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction transformed the criticism of fiction and soon became a classic in the field. One of the most widely used texts in fiction courses, it is a standard reference point in advanced discussions of how fictional form works, how authors make novels accessible, and how readers recreate texts, and its concepts and terms—such as "the implied author," "the postulated reader," and "the unreliable narrator"—have become part of the standard critical lexicon. For this new (...) edition, Wayne C. Booth has written an extensive Afterword in which he clarifies misunderstandings, corrects what he now views as errors, and sets forth his own recent thinking about the rhetoric of fiction. The other new feature is a Supplementary Bibliography, prepared by James Phelan in consultation with the author, which lists the important critical works of the past twenty years—two decades that Booth describes as "the richest in the history of the subject.". (shrink)

Written not by a journalist or politician but rather by a theology professor with a Ph.D. in New Testament studies, Voting by the Bible: The Economic and Foreign Policy Issues begins with the assumption that God intended the Bible to give guidance to every area of life£including how governments should function. Derived from author Wayne Grudemþs magisterial Politics£According to the Bible, this book highlights those economic and foreign-policy issues that have dominated political debate recently. Throughout, author Wayne (...) Grudem supports political positions that would be called more 'conservative' than 'liberal.' However, 'it is important to understand that I see these positions as flowing out of the Bible's teachings rather than positions I hold prior to, or independently of, those biblical teachings,' he writes. 'My primary purpose in the book is not to be liberally or conservative, or Democrat or Republican, but to explain a biblical worldview and a biblical perspective on issues of politics, law, and government.' Concise yet carefully argued, this book is a must-read for any Christian concerned about current debates over the economy, the size and role of government, and the best way forward out of the current recession. Not every reader will agree with the book's conclusions. But by grounding his analysis deeply on Scripture, Grudem has equipped Christians to better understand and respond to some of today's key political debates wisely and in a manner consistent with their primary citizenship as members and ambassadors of the kingdom of God" -- Publisher description. (shrink)

In Practical Reality, Jonathan Dancy argues that our reasons for action are not psychological states, but things we take to be facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that intentional actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that explanations of action in terms of reasons are not causal explanations. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory of reasons according to which what it (...) is for an action to be done for a reason is for certain beliefs and desires to cause the action. Our reasons for action are the contents of those beliefs and desires. This theory is not only compatible with the facts about reasons Dancy has established, but explains many things that Dancy’s theory does not account for. I make no claim here about the precise adequacy of the simplified theoretical definitions I present. My goal is to show that a systematic theory along these lines is a promising approach to understanding an important aspect of human nature. (shrink)

At first thought, our question of the day seems to be "about the text itself." Is there, in all texts, or at least in some texts, what Abrams calls "a core of determinate meanings," "the central core of what they [the authors] undertook to communicate"? Miller has seemed to find in the texts of Nietzsche a claim that there is not, that "the same text authorizes innumerable interpretations: There is no 'correct' interpretation. . . . reading is (...) never the objective identifying of a sense but the importation of meaning into a text which has no meaning 'in itself.'" Abrams claims that Miller cannot report on Nietzsche's deconstructionist claims without violating them: Miller seems to claim that he has found something that Nietzsche's text really says, not something that Miller himself merely brought to it. Is this objection a quibble or a clincher?1 · 1. See my "M.H. Abrams: Historian as Critic, Critic as Pluralist," Critical Inquiry 2 : 411-45, and Abrams' reply, "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History," pp. 447-64, esp. 456-58. Wayne C. Booth's other contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing" , "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais Revisited" , "Notes and Exchanges" , "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation" ,"Ten Literal 'Theses" , with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction: A Conversation" , and with Robert E. Streeter, W.J.T. Mitchell: "Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979". (shrink)

This volume explores the role of some of the most prominent twentieth-century philosophers and political thinkers as teachers. It examines what obstacles they confronted as teachers and how they overcame them in conveying truth to their students in an age dominated by ideological thinking.

We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the ‘letter’ of Lehrer's theory, (...) other criticisms can be aimed at its very ‘spirit’. We would argue that coherence is unnecessary for justification because of the existence of ‘basic beliefs’, those about self-presenting states (‘I have a tingling sensation in my leg’) or self-evident truths (‘All men are men’). Such beliefs may be justified even though there are no other propositions in the subject's acceptance system that makes them more probable than competitors. Coherence is, moreover, insufficient for justification, because it ignores the inferential structure of the subject's acceptance system, and requires no justification of any kind for the subject's acceptance system itself. But we must develop these more fundamental objections on another occasion. (shrink)

In his article “Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of Feminist Criticism” , Wayne Booth develops an argument for “ethical” literary criticism, criticism that is concerned with the ideologies inherent in works of literature and the effects these ideologies may have on the reader. Or, as he phrases it himself: “What we are talking about [is] human ideals, how they are created in art and thus implanted in readers and left uncriticized” . Booth’s starting point, his (...) “inspiration” for this argument, is Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “dialogism” and, in particular, Bakhtin’s use of this notion in his interpretation of François Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel narratives.1 For those not familiar with Booth’s essay , I will briefly summarize his argument in support of ethical criticism.Booth begins with much praise for Bakhtin because Bakhtin seems to have discovered in Rabelais a linguistic technic that frees the reader from the ideologies inherent in language . As Booth paraphrases Bakhtin, any writer who employs the languages of different ideologies within one text freed the reader from the “prison-house of language” to the extent that he allows the reader to view each ideology from the outside, from these other languages, so that this reader can judge each ideology in terms other than those which the ideology builds into its own language. 1. See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky . Richard M. Berrong is visiting assistant professor of French at the University of Nebraska. He is the author of Every Man for Himself: Social Order and Its Dissolution in Rabelais and Rabelair and Bakhtin Revisited: The Presence and Exclusion of Popular Culture in “Gargantua and Pantagruel”. (shrink)